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RECENT BOOKS 
.ARMS CoN'IROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW. By Louis Henkin. 
With a Foreword by Philip C. Jessup. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 1958. Pp. x, 289. Index. $5.50. 
The character of war has changed qualitatively with the development 
of new "absolute" weapons against which there is no effective defense. Arms 
regulation under international control has become a central problem of 
American foreign policy and in the Geneva negotiations for the cessation 
of nuclear weapons tests, the great powers came to grips with real issues 
and concrete solutions for the first time in the long history of disarmament 
discussions. 
The recently-published Feld Report, prepared by a group of American 
scientists, emphasizes the necessity for obtaining more knowledge than is 
now available on the technical problems of disarmament, on topics ranging 
from the detection of nuclear explosions and radioactivity to the surveil-
lance of weapons production facilities. The Report concludes that such 
technical research is essential for making sound policy decisions before and 
during disarmament negotiations and also may encourage governments to 
seek appropriate types of arms limitation agreements, some of which may 
previously have not been considered feasible or desirable.1 
The need for more knowledge is not limited to the technical aspects of 
arms control. As Judge Philip C. Jessup points out in his forceful intro-
duction to Professor Henkin's volume, "Arms Control and Inspection in 
American Law," no one seems to have heretofore studied the problem from 
the point of view of the legal and administrative issues involved in enforc-
ing an inspection system in the United States. This may be due, he sug-
gests, to the fact that the entire subject has appeared to the public as "re-
mote governmental business," removed from the individual and from the 
community. Yet every citizen would be deeply concerned if, for instance, 
the United States should accept an agreement giving an international in-
spection team the right to enter a plant which he owns or where he works 
or even the home where he lives. While legal and constitutional considera-
tions of course will not determine the basic arms control policy, they will 
have to be taken into account at least in ensuring that any control agree-
ment which the United States would want to urge upon others can be 
made effective by and in the United States. 
In order to reach the constitutional and legal issues, Professor Henkin 
was required to project his thinking and speculate on three different levels. 
That he succeeded in his undertaking is telling evidence of his imaginative 
prowess. 
The first and "highest" level of his speculation called for developing cer-
tain minimum assumptions of what American arms control policy will be 
1 FELD, BRENNAN, FRISCH, QUINN 8: ROCHLIN, THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF ARMs 
CONTROL-A REPORT TO THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER l (1960). 
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in the years ahead. Professor Henkin calls his book "a memorandum of 
law," and his policy projection is limited to providing background and 
foundation for the legal study. Consequently only the first chapter, con-
taining sixteen pages, is devoted to this topic, and future American policy 
is sketched in a very general outline based on past proposals: while retain-
ing full military strength and capacity for reprisal, the United States will 
be prepared initially to enter into agreement on small steps including 
limitations on the number of men under arms, a moratorium on the testing 
of new weapons and on the production of nuclear materials for additional 
weapons, subject of course to inspection, including aerial inspection. In 
discussing the future place of disarmament in American foreign policy, 
Professor Henkin states that "The United States earnestly seeks disarma-
ment"; (p. 9) yet two pages later he reports that "Even in the consternation 
caused by the missile race, leaders in Congress and in government, with few 
exceptions, appear to exclude arms control from serious consideration in 
the development of national policy." (p. 11) This apparent contradiction 
illustrates the distressing dilemma of responsible men in the United States 
who accept the need for arms regulation but justly suspect that the primary 
if not the only objective of the Soviet Union in past disarmament nego-
tiations was unilateral disarmament of the West. 
The second level of Professor Henkin's speculation concerns the content 
of the control and inspection provisions in an imaginary future agreement 
on arms regulation. The provisions which he postulates in the second 
chapter, a brief eight pages, are not found in any one proposal hitherto 
made but are instead a distillation of various suggestions and estimates of 
what may be required. Here the author relies in part on the results of a 
parallel technical inquiry by Columbia University Institute of War and Peace 
Studies.2 The assumption is that an international agreement in the form 
of a treaty would be ratified by the United States with the necessary imple-
menting legislation adopted by the Congress. The treaty would provide 
for control of possession and manufacture of certain arms, munitions and 
materials, and of the conduct of certain activities by anyone in the United 
States, the type and disposition of armed forces, verification, reporting and 
inspection by international inspectors employing any known method in-
cluding aerial observation, acoustic and seismic devices, physical entry, etc. 
Professor Henkin refers in a footnote to the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, which contains a framework of safeguards and in-
spection relating to nuclear material. The area of speculation might have 
been reduced somewhat if more detailed consideration had been given by 
the author to these provisions which were accepted by some seventy states, 
including the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The third and "lowest" level of Professor Henkin's projection deals with 
the impact on American law of the control and inspection provisions of 
2 !NSPECilON FOR DISARMAMENT (Melman ed. 1958). 
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his postulated agreement. This part forms the bulk of the volume. The 
fundamental question - can the United States under its Constitution agree 
to control arms, and if so, subject to what limitations? - leads to an expert 
examination of the limits upon the treaty power as defined through history 
from Geofroy v. Riggs, Missouri v. Holland to Reid v. Covert. Perhaps 
the most interesting part of the analysis is buried in footnotes which, alas, 
are inconveniently placed at the back of the volume in a misguided effort to 
make the book more palatable to the "layman." Having considered Articles 
II and VI of the Constitution and the possible objection that a treaty 
limiting U.S. armed forces impairs the President's power as "Commander-
in-Chief," or the congressional power to maintain "armies" and "a navy," 
or to declare war, Professor Henkin rejects any doubt as to the power of the 
United States under the Constitution to enter into an arms control agree-
ment. In the absence of some form of supra-national government, however, 
any such agreement would not be "irrevocable" in the sense of depriving 
Congress of the power to enact conflicting legislation. "Although there 
has not been adjudication in the courts of the validity of any disarmament 
agreement of the United States, this nation has made agreements in the 
past to limit the size of its navy and to disarm all vessels on the Great Lakes; 
it has also agreed in the United Nations Charter that the appropriate 
organ of the United Nations shall consider and recommend to members 
proposals for disarmament; and it has negotiated on disarmament on nu-
merous occasions with a view to concluding a treaty." (pp. 28-29) In a 
similar vein, Professor Henkin investigates the constitutional provisions 
relating to the rights of states ("the reserved powers" and the state militia 
provisions) and the rights of persons (the right to bear arms under the 
second amendment, the protection of liberty and property under the fifth 
amendment, the patent rights and the due process protection of academic 
and intellectual freedom) to conclude that these provisions likewise would 
not bar an arms control treaty. 
In Chapter IV, the author examines the extent to which measures which 
would be required to investigate and enforce compliance with arms control 
would conform to the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. 
His analysis includes both indirect methods (such as reports by govern-
ments, aerial inspection and wire-tapping) and direct interrogation by an 
international inspectorate of U.S. officials and private citizens, as well as 
inspection of private enterprises and dwellings. To be lawful, an inspection 
of a dwelling without a court warrant might require a constitutional 
amendment, he concludes. 
Chapter V deals with the type of congressional legislation which would 
be necessary to implement arms control, particularly the regulatory legisla-
tion and immunity statutes to offset the privilege against self-incrimination 
and to define privileges and immunities of the inspectors. 
In Chapter VI, pointing to the unhappy experience with Prohibition 
and some other attempts at federal regulation, Professor Henkin stresses 
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the need for popular acceptance of any controls and for support from state 
and local authorities: "Some eccentric elements in a control scheme . . . 
might even require formal state consent by legislation or constitutional 
amendment. In other respects, state action ... might be important or help-
ful." Only a brief seven pages are devoted to this important aspect; but in 
this and in other instances where one might wish for a fuller exploration 
of the questions raised, the author's restraint is understandable considering 
the limited objective which he had set for himself. 
The concluding Chapters VII and VIII consider the constitutional 
problems which would arise if important powers of regulation, administra-
tion and adjudication should be delegated to an international control body 
with authority over American citizens. 
The author's conclusions confirm his mature political judgment, his 
sense of reality and proper appraisal of the role of law in policy making. 
In general, he points out, legal as well as domestic political problems would 
be avoided if the United States Government were made responsible to an 
international control body, and if the national government rather than 
the international body were given the task to regulate the activities of its 
citizens to assure the nation's compliance with the treaty. This would 
avoid "the new and difficult issues" involved in a system of international 
administrative process applied directly to the citizens. Professor Henkin 
makes a convincing case that the probable characteristics of an arms con-
trol plan, including essentials of direct inspection, would lie largely within 
the United States Constitution. It is the "eccentric, perhaps the extreme 
suggestion" which is not necessary to effective enforcement - the incursion 
into the home - which would raise major constitutional questions. As for 
the implementing legislation, the Congress would be required to establish 
a system of regulation not unlike that which applies to existing regulated 
industries. The Atomic Energy Act, to mention one example, would re-
quire extensive revision, and legislation would be necessary to protect the 
citizen and industry from damage or loss due to abuse of the inspection 
process. But for most of the legislation envisaged, there is precedent in 
existing laws, and, in its impact on the citizen, arms control "should not 
prove more onerous, more jarring to traditional behavior and liberties than 
control of narcotics, or liquor, or firearms, or filled milk.'' (p. 154) Few 
Americans would probably hear of the "foreign" inspectors and fewer still 
would have contact with them. 
These concluding thoughts confirm what hardly needs any confirmation: 
the important obstacles to arms control have not been in law but in "the 
foreign policies of nations," first and foremost of the Soviet Union. Yet 
Professor Henkin warns that were the Soviet Union to make important 
concessions toward reasonable agreement, there might still be opposition 
in the United States to substantial reduction and control of arms because 
of the fear and distrust of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of this reviewer, 
the understandable fear of impairing the essential military strength of the 
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United States has made it impossible thus far for the United States Gov-
ernment to develop technically sound, comprehensive and detailed pro-
posals which would provide for realistic inspection safeguards commensu-
rate with each progressive step of the plan and which could be offered as a 
basis for realistic negotiations. If there should be any indication of a sub-
stantial modification of the Soviet attitude, it will be necessary, Professor 
Henkin suggests, "to educate ourselves in new habits of thought. . . . The 
purpose of a defense policy," he states, "is to forestall and, if possible, 
remove danger. The United States may do that more effectively by dis-
arming its enemies than by frantically building up its armaments of un-
certain comparative effectiveness ... .'' (p. 156) 
The nineteenth-century American lawyer did not feel compelled to 
think ahead when the steam-engine was about to change the face of the 
Continent and affect profoundly the lives of its people; he was satisfied to 
confront the new problems as they emerged in litigations before the courts 
or as they demanded urgent remedial legislation. In our century, the high 
stakes in preserving peace and the social values involved do not allow the 
leisurely empirical and pragmatic approach of the last century. Today, 
when an important advance in technology presents new social problems, a 
modem lawyer who has acquired some understanding of the technical, 
political and economic implications can make an important contribution 
in the policy-making process by anticipating institutional and administra-
tive questions and suggesting alternative solutions. This applies to ad-
vances in the field of atomic energy, use of the outer space, and automation 
- to mention only a few. Professor Henkin has shown in his stimulating 
volume, written in an urbane and lively prose, that the proposition applies 
also in the field of arms control. Today, his book should prove interesting 
to planners; and if any progress is made toward an agreement on arms 
control, it will become invaluable to negotiators and lawmakers. 
Eric Stein, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
